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Hegel’s presence in Rorty
1.
Hegel is a philosophical giant that appears in all Rorty’s books, 
his specter hovers over the Rortyan conception of philosophy and 
his attitude towards the history of philosophy. But Rorty is 
interested only in one side of Hegel’s philosophy, namely the Hegel 
from Phenomenology of Spirit rather than the older Hegel -  the 
creator of the system. The "young Hegel" is one of the greatest 
Rorty’s heroes (if we think of his philosophical figures in term of 
good and bad guys, heroes and villains). Rorty never devoted an 
article to him, nor did he write about him more than a page or two 
in one place. He never wrote about him in the way a historian of 
philosophy writes about his "subject" -  in a detailed, strict, severe 
and dull manner (to make perhaps too far a generalization). In a 
great narrative about the history of philosophy written over the 
years by Rorty, Hegel appears as a turning point in European 
philosophical tradition: it is he who breaks the "Plato-Kant canon”, 
who begins the "tradition of ironist philosophy", as Rorty labels it, 
continued by Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida. He is the founder 
of such kind of philosophy -  called also by Rorty a "literary genre" 
or (cultural) "criticism" -  in which philosophers define their 
achievements through the relation with their predecessors rather 
than with truth.1 He is for Rorty a paradigm of the ironist’s abilities 
to use the possibilities offered by redescriptions of the past. And 
finally it is he who in Rorty’s stories is opposed to Kant (and Plato) 
-  in the history of philosophy Rorty always favors "Hegelians" as 
opposed to "Kantians" in his specific sense of both terms.1 2 He is 
for Rorty a paradigm of historicism, a model way in which one can
1 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 79.
2 See Richard Rorty, "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism", PP 1, pp. 
197-198.
abandon the ideal of philosophy as a search for ahistorical, 
atemporal and transcendental truths.
Historicization of reason, "temporalization of rationality" -  was 
"the single most important step in arriving at the pragmatist’s 
d istrust of Philosophy", Rorty says about Hegel in his 
"Introduction" to Consequences of Pragmatism3 Hegel gave 
philosophy the sense of finitude, temporality, historicity of its 
problems, helped it to realize that vocabularies change in history, 
that they are temporal and transient. Rorty’s Hegel is a romantic 
conducting congenial reinterpretations of earlier interpretations, 
presenting redescriptions of redescriptions, telling stories about 
old stories in a new terminology; Hegel is a "poet" in Rorty’s wide 
sense of the term (that is, "one who makes things new”4), a "strong 
philosopher" who is interested in dissolving old, inherited problems 
rather than in solving them.5
In one of philosophical narratives about recent two centuries of 
philosophy sketched by Rorty in Consequences of Pragmatism 
Hegel plays a crucial role in philosophy’s achieving pragmatic 
consciousness:
Under cover of Kant’s invention, a new super-science 
called "philosophy", Hegel invented a literary genre 
which lacked any trace of argumentation, but which 
obsessively captioned itself System der Wissenschaftor 
W issenschaft der Logik, or Enzyklopädie der 
Philosophischen Wissen sch a ften.6
The main Hegelian legacy in the nineteenth century was the 
sense of the possibility of "forgetting about science", the ability of 
the literary culture to stand apart from science, to assert its spiritual 
superiority to it.7 The way from Kant to pragmatism is presented 
to have taken the following form: Kant and Idealism (philosophy
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3 Richard Rorty, CP. xli.
4 Richard Rorty, CIS, pp. 12-13.
5 Ibidem, p. 40.
6 Richard Rorty, CP, s. 147
Ibidem, p. 149.7
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as the "third road", transcending both religion and science, 
allowing to see "the ultimate nature of the reality"), then Hegel and 
romanticism (philosophy as "science" only by name and as a 
matter of fact as a new literary genre) and finally Nietzsche and 
James who -  at the same time and independently from each other 
- replace romanticism with pragmatism, that is, with the belief that 
new ways of speaking, new vocabularies, can help us to get what 
we want rather than to discover hitherto hidden secrets. The 
significance of vocabularies is thus not in their ability of decoding 
reality, reading essences, but rather in their utility -  that is the 
message of pragmatism which used German romanticism, notably 
Hegel, for its own purposes.8
Rorty often refers to the Hegelian definition of philosophy as 
"holding your time in thought". He says in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity that he understands this Hegel’s famous phrase as 
follows: it means "finding a description of all the things 
characteristic of your time of which you most approve, with which 
you unflinchingly identify, a description which will serve as a 
description of the end toward which the historical developments 
which led up to your time were means“ 9 Holding in thought what 
is most precious from one’s own epoch: Rorty reaches for Hegel 
in his narratives making him a key figure for the development of 
modern philosophical consciousness. He thereby differs in his 
reading of Hegel from Jürgen Habermas who sees in Hegel the 
beginning of a dead-end, the beginning of the "philosophy of 
subjectivity" which has already exhausted its possibilities.10 1In 
Rorty’s reading, the wrong step was made by Kant rather than 
Hegel, the Kant who separated science, morality and art11 and
8 And therefore Dewey is "between Darwin and Hegel", see Rorty’s text 
"Dewey between Darwin and Hegel" in Rorty and Pragmatism. The Philosopher 
Responds to His Critics, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp (Nashville: Vanderbilt UP, 
1995), pp. 1-15.
9 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 55.
10 From commentaries, see especially David M. Rasmussen, Reading 
Habermas, chapter "Reading Habermas: Modernity vs. Postmodernity" 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 94-113 and R. C. Holub, Jürgen Habermas. 
Critic in the Public Sphere (London: Routledge, 1991), chapter "Modernity and 
Postmodernity: the Debate with J.-F. Lyotard", pp. 133-161.
11 Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity", PP 2, p. 170.
tu rned  ph ilosophy into a fo unda tiona l and 
epistemologically-orienteddiscipline12 rather than the Hegel who 
has shown for the first time fully consciously the possibilities of 
historicity for philosophy.13
2.
I shall be trying to show in the present excursus that the 
Hegelian Odyssey of Spirit from his Phenomenology is one of 
great models of the Rortyan narrativism and that Hegelian 
procedures of generating his own vision of philosophies of the past 
described by Rorty -  correspond perfectly well to his own conduct 
and his recommendation how to proceed in philosophy. As is often 
the case with Rorty -  his reading of Derrida’s methods and his own 
methods, his readings of the so-called "textualists" and his own 
procedures, and also his reading of Hegel’s strategies in 
philosophy and his own are very similar. One could perhaps dare 
to make the following generalization: Rorty writes about other 
philosophers, about the ways they practise philosophy, about their 
invention, originality and innovations -  imposing on them (or -  
reading in them) his own experiences and conclusions drawn from 
them (which corresponds to the "pragmatist’s grid" he imposes on 
fiction he reads and of which he says in the text devoted to Umberto
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12 As Rorty puts it in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: "Kant... managed 
to transform the old notion of philosophy- metaphysics as 'queen of the sciences’ 
because of its concern with what was most universal and least material -  into 
the notion of a 'most basic’ discipline -  a foundational discipline". PMN, p. 132.
13 Which was revolutionary, to be sure. Although earlier Montesquie in his 
On the Spirit of Rights said that the constitution of a given nation is a product of 
its history, it was only with Hegel that historicism became self-conscious and 
directed against pretenses and illusions of philosophy itself. The turn away from 
ahistoricity of history of philosophy in Hegel was a turn against the Platonic 
tradition of practising philosophy. Philosophy in Hegel’s hands is no longer an 
atemporal, apriori reflection of permanent forms and ideas, it becomes 
self-consciousness of some culture, an expression, defence and criticism of its 
fundamental beliefs. What comes to mind here is Rorty from the first version of 
his response to Lyotard when he says that Dewey’s pragmatism was a 
"philosophical apologia of political liberalism" ("Cosmopolitanism without 
Emancipation", typescript, p. 1). See also Frederick Beiser’s article on "Hegel’s 
Historicism" in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 
pp. 270-300.
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Eco’s Foucault’s Pendulum14). His "grid" is so strong -  and his 
rhetoric so persuasive and convincing - that he manages to read 
in philosophers he reads his own philosophical beliefs. And there 
is nothing surprising in the fact if we realize how "strong" a 
textualist and how "strong" a philosopher -  a "poet" in his wide 
sense -  Rorty in his readings of philosophy is. I take it as one of 
the most vivid marks of his philosophical genius, and the trait 
responsible to a considerable degree for his international 
intellectual success. So, as in the case of readings of Plato 
presented above: we should not look for Hegel himself in Rorty, 
for we can only find individual and almost private "Rorty’s Hegel" 
there: the Hegel of his needs and of his imaginations, the hero of 
his narrative with a pre-established role, located well in advance 
in a fixed place, next to others -  also set well in advance -  
opponents and followers (let us bear in mind that it was Rorty who 
mentioned the possibility that in his conversation of humankind 
"creatures of our own fantasy" would participate15). Between 
those heroes -  like Plato, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger or 
Dewey -  there emerge individual and unique links of philosophical 
sympathies and antipathies, links imposed once by the producer 
of the narrative, Richard Rorty. That is the reason why Hegel does 
not close German idealism and in Rorty’s descriptions is first of all 
the greatest romantic, Nietzsche is so pragmaticized with his 
definition of truth as a "mobile army of metaphors" that he says 
"the same" as James as long as the latter abandons the theory of 
truth as correspondence to reality etc. etc. All the aforementioned 
figures are not heroes of some history of philosophy in general -  
they are specific and individual heroes and villains of the Rortyan 
history of philosophy which does not even attempt to be the proper, 
or only, or exhaustive one but rather is an auxiliary narrative 
constructed by Rorty over the years, needed by him for the 
description and definition of his own pragmatism and of himself as 
a philosopher. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why there was
14 See Richard Rorty, "The Pragmatist’s Progress" in Umberto Eco et a!., 
Interpretation and Overinterpretation (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), pp. 89-108.
15 Richard Rorty, "Historiography: Four Genres”, Philosophy in History 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1984), p. 71.
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never published any Rorty’s article on Plato, Kant or Hegel, for 
they themselves may turn out to be not too interesting for Rorty. 
They can only exist fuller when put in a greater whole, given voice 
within a greater, ongoing philosophical conversation. What is 
needed is what Rorty calls a "big sweeping story" -  a story told 
with courage and a vision in mind. 6 Perhaps all Rorty’s philosophy 
can be read as such a story. And perhaps it will turn out some day 
that -  using his own distinctions -  he will not be the author of 
geistesgeschichten but will be read as an "intellectual historian" 
who gives a wide, synoptic vision: he will be read not as the one 
who merely presents stories from the history of philosophy using 
others’ big visions but as the one who produces these visions 
himself.
As an example of inscribing in past philosophers (or, more 
generally -  In other philosophers) his own beliefs, let us try to 
discuss briefly Rorty’s account of philosophy suggested in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity and compare it to his 
description of Hegel’s achievements. From the convergence 
between the two there can emerge a provisional conclusion (made 
for the purposes of that particular little "philosophical excursus”) 
that Hegel is for Rorty a model, that -  inscribing In Hegel his own 
principles and then realizing them in practice -  he would like 
himself to be a figure as great as Hegel, with one reservation 
though: without looking for a "larger-than-self hero", like the Spirit 
for Hegel, Europe for Nietzsche or Being for Heidegger. (The 
aforementioned figures are ironist theoreticians who are not 
satisfied with small pictures in philosophy, who want instead to 
describe "a big thing": history, Western man, metaphysics - 
claiming most often that it has just been completed, or exhausted 
its possibilities for only then could they count as exceptional 
figures, as events in its history. Rorty says that ironist theoreticians 
"are not interested only in making themselves new. They also want 
to make this big thing new; their own autonomy will be a spin-off 
from this larger newness".16 7 It is precisely this big hero -  Europe,
16 Richard Rorty, "The state of philosophy in the United States", a typescript, 
p. 5.
17 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 101.
Spirit, Being -  that separates them from mere ironists, 
paradigmatically in Rorty from Proust in The Remembrance of 
Things Past. While the above philosophers want to be "first 
postmetaphysicians" or "philosophers of the future", Proust merely 
describes what he had encountered in his life; producing his great 
work -  he produces himself, and has no public ambitions: “Proust 
succeeded [where Heidegger failed -  MK] because he had no 
public ambitions -  no reason to believe that the sound of the name 
’Guermantes’ would mean anything to anybody but his narrator".18 
Heidegger, on the other hand, in such an opposition between 
ironists and ironist theoreticians constructed by Rorty, believed 
that he knew certain words which had, or should have had, 
resonance for everybody in modern Europe: "words which were 
relevant not just to the fate of people who happen to have read a 
lot of philosophy books but to the public fate of the Wesf ,19 This 
is perhaps the most important reservation to be made -  Rorty does 
not accept such a hero of his narrative, at least officially, so to 
speak, for one could remark that a similar, to an extent, "big hero" 
of his philosophy might be "liberal democracy", although he would 
obviously, and rightly, respond that it is a political rather than 
philosophical choice and that philosophy in his account is strictly 
separated from politics).
Returning to the theme we abandoned for a while, let us remind 
what Rorty says:
Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination of the 
pros and cons of a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or 
explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary 
which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new 
vocabulary which vaguely promises great things.20
Surely, we are inclined to suggest that the vocabulary which 
"vaguely promises great things" is Rorty’s vocabulary. Such a 
"method" of philosophy brings it close to "utopian politics" and
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18 Ibidem, p. 118.
19 Ibidem, p. 118 -  emphasis mine.
20 Ibidem, p. 9 -  emphasis mine.
"revolutionary science" -  and it is "to redescribe lots and lots of 
things in new ways" until you have created a pattern of linguistic 
behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt this rather 
than that vocabulary. Thus this sort of philosophy works 
"holistically" and "pragmatically"21 rather than piece by piece, in 
small steps, analyzing concepts by concepts or verifying a thesis 
by thesis. It directs the following recommendation to the reader: 
"try thinking of it in this way", "try to ignore the apparently futile 
traditional questions by substituting the following new and possibly 
interesting questions", "stop doing those things and do something 
else". Let us quote one more sentence, referring to the whole 
project of a liberal utopia presented in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity.
I am not going to offer arguments against the vocabulary 
I want to replace. Instead, I am going to try to make the 
vocabulary I favor look attractive by showing how it may 
be used to describe a variety of topics.22
3.
This is what Rorty says in his metaphilosophical generalizations 
and concrete recommendations. Now the time has come to 
present the picture of Hegel in Rorty (and the point is to bear in 
mind both Hegel and Rorty at the same time): Hegel "created new 
problems in place of the old", as he says in Consequences of 
Pragmatisrr?3, the vision of truth from Phenomenology of Spirit is 
that it is "what you get by reinterpreting all the previous 
reinterpretations of reinterpretations"24, the Hegelian dialectical 
method is not an argumentative procedure but merely a literary 
skill at "producing surprising gestalt switches by making smooth, 
rapid transitions from one terminology to another".25 Rorty’s Hegel
166 Philosophical Excursus III: Hegel's presence in Rorty
21 Ibidem, p. 9.
22 Ibidem, p. 9.
23 Richard Rorty, "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey", CP, 
p. 40.
24 Richard Rorty, "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing", CP. p. 95.
25 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 78.
Philosophical Excursus III: Hegel’s presence in Rorty 167
from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity avoids argumentation -  
constantly changing vocabularies; in practice, he drops the idea 
of reaching truth in favor of the idea of "making things new" (and 
interesting). It is not the case that their predecessors’ claims are 
false, the case is that their language is obsolete 26 He invents new 
tools to replace old ones, creates the third vocabulary rather than 
discovers how the two old ones can be combined27, to use 
Habermas’ terminology: he is an oracular "world-discloser" rather 
than argumentative "problem-solver".28 *He is a paradigm of anOQ
ironist who uses "massive redescriptions". The similarities are 
striking. Thus, Rorty may appear from the above brief presentation 
as today’s Hegel -  a producer of a convincing narrative from the 
history of philosophy -  wiser owing to philosophical experience of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, pragmatists and even Derrida and the 
French, as we are trying to show elsewhere in the book. I think it 
is important to look at his neopragmatist narratives -  in which 
Hegel may be a model for Rorty -  also from this sort of perspective.
If we are now dealing with such issues as Rorty’s attitude 
towards great constructions of the history of philosophy, let us 
remind his conception of narratives (Geistesgeschichten). Rorty 
distinguishes between four kinds of philosophy: reconstructions 
(rational and historical ones), narratives, doxography and 
intellectual history. Historical reconstructions speak of past 
philosophers in the context of their present, in the context of their 
discussions with philosophers contemporary to them. Rational 
reconstructions, on the other hand, turn old philosophers into 
conversational partners for today’s philosophers and their 
problems. Doxography, in turn, is a kind of philosophy in the form 
of books about history of philosophy, let us say, "from Tales to 
Derrida", which, as a genre, "inspires boredom and despair”31, for 









Richard Rorty, "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?", PP 2, p. 123.
Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 79.
Richard Rorty, "Four Genres", op. cit.
Ibidem, p. 62.
list of philosophical problems. Finally, the fourth genre, intellectual 
history, constructs the picture of the past in terms of the present, 
referring to as wide a context as possible, to figures from out of 
the canon of recognized philosophers, to "limit cases"; its role is 
to inspire reformulations of the canon of great, past philosophers. 
Historical reconstructions and rational reconstructions are so 
dependent on each other as intellectual histories are dependent 
on narratives.
Rorty’s favorite is "geistesgeschichte as canon-formation". 
This kind of philosophy takes responsibility for identifying which 
past philosophers are "great" (as opposed to both types of 
reconstructions, which brings them closer to the history of 
science), answers the question as to who counts as a philosopher 
and who does not. For Geisteshistoriker’s job is
assembling a cast of historical characters, and a 
dramatic narrative, which shows how we have come to 
ask the questions we now think inescapable and 
profound. Where these characters left writings behind, 
those writings then form a canon, a reading-list which 
one must have gone through in order to justify what one 
is.32 3
Geistesgeschichte wants to keep in us the awareness that we 
are still en route -  that the dramatic narrative it offers to us is to be 
continued by our descendants. At the same time, it attempts to 
justify philosophical beliefs of its producer, attempts to maintain a 
certain chosen and favored image of philosophy. It works on the 
level of problematics rather than on that of solutions to problems. 
Rorty in his philosophy clearly favors narratives as opposed to 
universal and totalizing theories, he is for reformulations of the past 
in the form of dramatic narratives performed on an individual basis 
and against reproduction of the "history of philosophy" as the one 
which is non-contingent and based on a purported consensus, 
against an unchangeable and established once and for all march
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32 Ibidem, p. 71.
33 Ibidem, p. 61.
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through the same problems -  towards solutions of them and 
towards the truth. Rorty is supported in this belief by irony and 
rhetoric, by a persuasive nature of his undertaking: the canon is 
being formulated all the time, it is being formulated by those who 
are the most convincing in their philosophical narratives. Let us 
read books and let us put them in the context of other books, as 
Rorty says in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Let us make new 
lists of positive and negative heroes, new goodies and new 
baddies, new taxonomies, new lists of interesting philosophers, 
new alliances in the history of philosophy, let us impose our 
vocabulary to others’ vocabularies, using them for our current 
purposes. Hegel comes in handy to Rorty all the time. He allows 
him to construe a counterbalance for the Kantian sort of philosophy 
which, in turn, is a dark spot in numerous narratives about 
modernity, starting with Philosophy and the Mirror of A/afure where 
Kant is presented as the one who transformed philosophy into a 
"foundational" discipline, to Rorty’s discussions from "Freud and 
Moral Reflection" from Philosophical Papers where he is charged 
with having left the possibility of enriching the vocabulary of moral 
deliberation only to "novelists, poets, dramatists"34, to discussions 
from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity where Kant is opposed 
once again to Freud who managed to replace the picture of man 
as the Kantian "dutiful fulfiller of universal obligations" -  with that 
in which "each human life is a poem", for a democratized genius 
has been given to each individual in the form of creative 
unconsciousness.35 Human self in Rorty’s description as a "web
34 Richard Rorty, ''Freud and Moral Reflection", PP 2, p. 156.
35 Konstantin Kolenda who wrote the first in the Anglo-Saxon world book 
about Rorty, Rorty’s Humanistic Pragmatism (Tampa: University of South Florida 
Press, 1990), provided it with the following subtitle: Philosophy Democratized. 
He says that "We are reminded by Rorty that thought originating in any branch 
of intellectual activity may have practical consequences in the general climate of 
opinion, but it is no less valuable when it produces no more than a constructive 
change in the thinker's or reader’s self-image. This is the sense in which 
philosophy becomes democratized..." (p. xv -  emphasis mine). Let us add here 
that "democracy" obviously does not come from the individual Greek “daimonion" 
(false etymologies!) but from "demos", "people". Thus Kolenda’s picture would 
be of an individualized, privatized - egotistic etc. philosophy. This can throw 
some additional light to the American view of democracy as "live and let others 
live". Hence perhaps there may appear the difference: (Rortyan) "democratized"
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of beliefs and desires" is as far as possible from the Kantian 
well-formed system of the faculties of reason. The Hegelian 
question about progress in history is still open to Rorty, the owl of 
Minerva spreads its wings (no sooner than) at dusk, it is still a 
challenge because, as he puts it
we latecomers can tell the kind of story of progress which 
those who are actually making progress cannot. ... 
Those who made us possible could not have envisaged 
what they were making possible, and so could not have 
described the ends to which their work was a means.
But we can 36
And it is precisely the Hegelian historicism, manifesting itself in 
his definition from The Philosophy of Right, that is so important for 
Rorty’s self-identity that it is worth being remembered. Apart from 
Blumenberg, Bloom, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Heidegger 
and Freud -  Hegel is one of the most important Rorty’s heroes. 
For, let us return to that memorable phrase, “we cannot do without 
heroes". Both in life and in our narratives. We need conversations 
with mighty dead philosophers, we want to see the history of our 
race as a "long conversational exchange"37 -  for, as Rorty said 
already in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, philosophers’ 
only moral concern should be "continuing the conversation of the 
West".38 And this is the breaking of the said conversation that 
separates the world of the Anglo-Saxon philosophy from that of 
the Continental one: in the former, generally, speaking and with 
few exceptions, to be sure, the conversational partners in 
departments of philosophy are neither Plato, nor Hegel, nor 
Nietzsche, nor Derrida, and thereby none of those who deals with 
them today. One point is essential -  the significance of the history
philosophy in Kolenda’s sense -  and philosophy ("in favor o f, "supporting") 
democracy. Two different philosophies, clearly so, and hence a tension -  and 
aversion! -  to calling this "democratized" bit of it "pragmatism" on the part of so 
many critics and commentators....
36 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 56.
37 Richard Rorty, "Four Genres", p. 51.
38 Richard Rorty, PMN, p. 394.
of philosophy. In the USA, since the arrival of positivists as 
refugees during the second world war, neither a new canon has 
been formed, nor an old one has been more strongly established 
-  for philosophical books from the past are of little Interest to 
professional philosophers. Rorty wrote once in Consequence of 
Pragmatism about a practical problem: who is going to "teach 
Hegel"? And perhaps it was not accidentally, we can speculate, 
that he used Hegel, the hero of the present "philosophical 
excursus" in this phrase?
4.
I think that it might be very interesting to supplement this 
excursus with a quick glance at Hegel’s presence in French 
philosophy (as part of our "European" contexts). What I would like 
to draw the attention to would be the status of Hegel as a "master 
thinker" right after the war, and then a passage from Hegel to 
Nietzsche in the sixties, and, finally, a gradual retreat from 
Nietzsche (and "Nietzscheans") at the end of the eighties and in 
the nineties. My story begins with "Hegel’s tyranny" in France. 
What requires an explanation is at least the phrase "Hegel’s 
tyranny". Precisely what period are we talking about, what sort of 
tyranny do we have in mind -  and finally, what Hegel do we mean? 
What we are interested in here -  within questions pertaining to the 
topicality of Hegel -  is a powerful and permanent influence he 
would exert on a pre-war and post-war French thought (the years 
of 1930-1960, roughly speaking) but as long as it became an object 
of sharp discordance and wide criticism of the next generation of 
thinkers and philosophers, the postmodern generation. Thus we 
will be dealing here with the generation of Alexandre Kojeve, Jean 
Hyppolite, Georges Bataille, reading and commenting on Hegel -  
mainly from the Phenomenology of Spirit -  against which there 
stood up the generation of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and 
Gilles Deleuze. While for the former generation Hegel was the 
master of thinking, matre a penser, for the other generation he was 
only (and yet still as much as) the figure to necessarily get free 
from. The paradigmatic shift of focus from Hegel to Nietzsche in 
France was revealed in the most powerful way in two books: Gilles
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Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) and P ierre 
Klossowski’s Nietzsche et le cercie vicieux( 1969). Since then, it 
has been Nietzsche rather than Hegel who seemed to provide
o g
French philosophical thought with a tone.
The question to ask in this place would be, for instance, the 
following: what was so peculiar about the Hegel that the whole 
generations of Hyppolite’s pupils (furthermore, the most brilliant 
participants in his seminars-such as Derrida and Foucault) turned 
against him with such solidarity? Who was the Hegel that would 
dominate French intellectual life for over thirty years, from Kojeve’s 
initially small, irregular and elitist lectures in Ecole Pratique des 
Hautes Etudes from 1933-1939, to Hegelian seminars in College 
de France in the turning of the sixties and the seventies? The 
question about that Hegel -  read mainly from the famous Chapter 
Four of the Phenomenology devoted to "dialectic of mastery and 
slavery" -  will help us in dealing with the issue of complicated 
relations between Hegel and postmodern thinkers of today’s 
France. We get the impression that one cannot understand current 
(or perhaps - recent, to which we shall return further in the text) 
French anti-Hegelian scenery without asking the questions what 
this Hegel was, where he came from and what the circumstances 
of his appearance were.39 40
The point here is not analyzing French Hegelian studies from 
pre-war and post-war period, for it was not they that exerted 
powerful influence on today’s and yesterday’s cultural face of 
France, and especially its philosophical face. Hegel dominated
39 Incidentally, some explicit enemies of postmodern thought -  like Luc Ferry 
and Alain Renaut -  in their (once) famous pamphlet French Philosophy of the 
Sixties, trans, by M.H.S. Cattani (Amherst: The Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 
1990) -  present the whole French "thought of difference" as only a radicalization 
of themes deriving from German philosophy. Hence also comes the very 
structure of their book -  it is devoted to French Nietzscheanism (Foucault), 
Heideggerianism (Derrida), Marxism (Bourdieu) and Freudianism (Lacan). From 
such a perspective, we all are merely repeating -  Plato...
40 The present piece asks a question about the passage from Hegel to 
Nietzsche as well as about Hegel himself in French account. An unavoidable in 
that context question about Nietzsche -  "the new Nietzsche", as says the title of 
the collection of texts edited by David Allison, famous in the Anglo-Saxon world 
- 1 am asking elsewhere.
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France after the war - he just tyrannized and paralyzed it with his 
presence, his discourse and conceptuality, like all later "masters 
of thinking".41 After the war, Hegel imposed the horizon of 
questions and answers, he was the single most serious 
philosophical authority. As Michel Foucault expressed the thought 
in the name of his generation in The Discourse on Language, i.e. 
in his opening lecture at Collège de France in 1970 -  when the 
battle with Hegel carried out with Nietzschean weapons was 
already definitely won: "... our age, whether through logic or 
epistemology, whether through Marx or through Nietzsche, is 
attempting to flee Hegel".42
But why should one "flee from Hegel" at all -  and is it possible 
to flee from him? How is one to break with Hegel if one lives and 
breathes in philosophy his dialectic, one thinks his language, 
argues with his arguments? That peculiar inability, that stiffening 
of tongue that attempts to oppose Hegel perhaps has been 
expressed in the best way by Emmanuel Levinas (in the text 
"Hegel and the Jews" from the collection of essays Dificile liberté); 
he said the following: "It is surely not easy to oppose Hegel’s 
speech. It is so not only because thought lacks audacity but 
because language as if becomes disobedient. There is hardly 
anything more deplorable than to ’express one’s view on Hegel’, 
to classify him..." 43 Language as if becomes disobedient, says 
Levinas, language becomes "completely mute", says Foucault, 
thinking somehow stops, not wanting, not being able to find familiar 
points of departure... How to avoid the situation which also 
Foucault mentions that when we set up on an anti-Hegelian 
journey -  at the end of it there will be Hegel who within his system, 
and especially within dialectic, forecast every opposition against 
himself. How to be "other than Hegel" rather than anti-Hegelian, 
how to avoid battles on a ground chosen by him, how to take a
41 For "masters of thinking" as spécialité de la maison of French philosophy, 
see Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1995), the chapter "The Master Thinker in French Philosophy", pp. 18-39.
42 Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language", appendix to Archeology 
of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972), p. 235.
43 Emmanuel Levinas, Dificile liberté, Albin Michel, 1963 (in Polish as Trudna 
wolność, trans. A. Kuryś, Gdynia: Atext, 1991, p. 252).
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non-Hegelian strategy? It is precisely the Nietzsche as presented 
by Derrida, Klossowski and Deleuze that came as the greatest 
help for the whole generation of French philosophers. He became, 
as the latter puts it, "the absolute opponent of dialectic", as 
Nietzsche’s philosophy is the "absolute anti-dialectic", and 
between the two, Hegel and Nietzsche, "there will be no 
compromise".44
Alexandre Kojève is of interest to us here as the one who 
shaped -  together with Jean Hyppolite -  the picture of Hegel in 
post-war France, influencing through his lectures e.g. Bataille, 
Lacan or Merleau-Ponty (in Specters of Marx Derrida says that 
nobody can deny the fact that the reading of Hegel by Kojève 
"played aformative and not negligible role, from many standpoints, 
for a certain generation of French intellectuals"45, to which in turn 
Richard Rorty replies mercilessly -  "so what?", it is no reason for 
him to be of any interest today -  and this is a really meaningful and 
interesting difference46). Georges Bataille is of interest to us here 
as long as in our account he is a figure at the philosophical 
cross-roads, the philosopher who suits neither the former nor the 
latter French generation described here, a philosopher who is both 
Hegelian and Nietzschean, reading at the same time Hegel and 
Nietzsche and approaching the reading of one of them with 
conceptual tools taken from the other. And finally, Michel Foucault 
and Jacques Derrida are two postmodern figures in whom a retreat 
from Hegel (for in Jean-François Lyotard it was a retreat from 
Marx47) -  with the help of Nietzsche read in a new way -  took the 
most clear forms.
The manifesto of the generation of Hyppolite’s students was 
Gilles Deleuze’s book, Nietzsche and Philosophy, published in
44 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: PUF, 1962), in Polish 
as Nietzsche i filozofia, trans. B. Banasiak, Warsaw: Spacja/Pavo, 1993, p. 205.
45 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of 
Mourning, and the New International, trans, by P. Kamuf (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 72.
46 Richard Rorty, “A Spectre is Haunting the Intellectuals", European Journal 
of Philosophy, vol. 3, number 3, December 1995, p. 295.
47 As I am trying to show in more detail in my Polish book Rorty and Lyotard. 
In the Labyrinths of Postmodernity.
1962. It was there that Nietzsche was for the first time presented 
as an anti-Hegel and his anti-Hegelianism was recognized as his 
philosophical mark (such a reading was then widely accepted by 
two big Nietzschean conferences in Royaumont in 1964 and then 
in Cerisy-la Salle in 1972, the papers of which were published in 
two thick volumes, not accidentally entitled Nietzsche aujourd’hui). 
The Hegel/Nietzsche opposition needed by the whole generation 
is clear and simple:"... dialectic is work and empiricism is pleasure. 
And who said that there is more thoughts in work than in 
pleasure?", or, in Deleuze’s words -  "Nietzschean ’yes’ opposes 
Hegelian ’no’ , affirmation opposes -  dialectical negation, 
difference -  dialectical contradiction, joy, pleasure -  dialectical 
work, lightness, dance -  dialectical heaviness, beautiful 
irresponsibility-dialectical duties". Let us remind: "II n’y a pas 
de compromis possible entre Hegel et Nietzsche" is Deleuze’s 
fundamental conviction. It is impossible in his view to understand 
the whole Nietzsche’s work if one does not note "against whom" 
its main concepts are directed. And the enemy is Hegel. "Hegelian 
themes -  says Deleuze -  are present in his work like an enemy 
whom he fights".48 9 Nietzsche intended to reveal all "mystifications" 
which were to find their last refuge in dialectic, he intended to free 
Hegel’s thought from the burden of its dialectic. Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is just incomprehensible in Deleuze’s account if one 
does not take into consideration its "fundamental pluralism": 
"pluralism is a purely philosophical way of thinking invented by 
philosophy: it is the only guarantee of freedom of a particular mind, 
the only principle of violent atheism. Gods died, but they died of 
laughter hearing that some God said that he was the only one".50 
Nietzsche seen through Deleuze’s eyes -  as well as through those 
of Pierre Klossowski from his book Nietzsche etle cercie vicieux 
and of Jacques Derrida from Eperons. Nietzsche’s Styles, and 
recently in America of Alexander Nehamas from Nietzsche. Life 
as Literature -  suggests a new way of thinking -  an affirmative
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48 Gilles Deleuze, pp. 13,13-14.
49 Ibidem, p. 171.
50 Ibidem, p. 8.
thought which, finally, "excludes each negativity".51 Instead of a 
speculative element of negation, opposition, contradiction -  
Nietzsche is to offer the element of difference, affirmation and 
pleasure. Nietzsche’s superman in Deleuze is to be directed 
against a dialectical conception of man, transvaluation -  against 
a dialectical elimination of alienation. Nietzsche’s work, to sum up, 
is according to Deleuze "saturated with anti-Hegelianism”.52
5.
Alexandre Kojeve conducted his seminars in the mood of a 
reneissance of Hegelian interests inspired by himself that began 
to spread towards the end of the twenties under the influence of 
e.g. Marxism and the Russian revolution. When Alexandre Koyre 
reported in 1930 during an international Hegelian congress "the 
state of Hegelian studies in France", he was forced to remark at 
the very beginning that his paper would be brief and poor in 
comparison with other ones for neither at that time nor earlier there 
was any Hegelian school, nor even an eminent student of Hegel.53 
Reasons enumerated by Koyre are manifold: first of all, difficulties 
in comprehending Hegel, the total oblivion into which he had fallen 
in the sixties of the nineteenth century when translations of his 
writings into French had been made, then -  a "return to Kant", and, 
finally, Hegel’s Protestantism. They had led to a dominating 
"attitude of hostility", as Koyre remarks; Hegelianism was 
degraded also due to highly infavorable opinions expressed by the
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51 Ibidem p. 14. Alexander Nehamas treats Nietzsche as a philosopher who 
creates an artwork -  we would say, in the manner of the late Foucault from his 
"aesthetics of existence" -  out of himself. "Nietzsche exemplifies through his own 
writings one way in which one individual may have succeeded in fashioning itself
- an individual, moreover, who, though beyond morality, is not morally 
objectionable. The individual is none other than Nietzsche himself, who is a 
creature of his own texts. This character does not provide a model for imitation, 
since he consists essentially of the specific actions - that is, of the specific writings
- that make him up, and which only he could write". Nietzsche. Life as Literature 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1985), p. 8.
52 Gilles Deleuze, p. 13.
53 Alexandre Koyré, "Rapport sur l’état des études hégéliennes en France" 
in: Études d'Histoire de la pensée philosophique (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, 
1961), p. 205.
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greatest philosophical authority of France after the first world war, 
Leon Brunschicg.54The turning point in the reception of Hegel was 
the book by Jean Wahl, Le Malheur de la conscience dans la 
philosophie de Hegel (1929) of which Jean Hyppolite was to write 
later that it had been a shock for all -  une sorte de révélation. Thus 
Hegel appeared in France of the thirties -  as if from nowhere 
(incidentally, out of the three Hegelian pioneers -  Wahl, Kojève, 
Koyré -  the latter two were Russian emigres whose interests and 
personal fates had thrown them before their arrival to France to 
Husserlian-Heideggerian Germany of the twenties). And rightafter 
the second world war everything avant-garde, modern and 
progressive referred to Hegel and his dialectic of "mastery and 
slavery" from Phenomenology.55 Finally, in the sixties, to paint this 
picture to the end that interests us here, the Hegelian page was 
turned once again - the point was, as Foucault put it in a passage 
quoted above, to "flee" from Hegel. As Vincent Descombes 
comments on this situation in a very good (especially in more 
historical passages) book Modern French Philosophy.
The difference separating the two generations [that of 
three ’H’s -  Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger -  and that which 
loved three "masters of suspicion" -  MK] lies in the 
inversion of the sign that marked the relationship to 
Hegel: everywhere a minus was substituted by a plus. 
The reference point remained the same.56
54 Ibidem, pp. 207, 208.
55 German Herrschaft and Knechtschaft is English mastery and slavery and 
French -  from Hyppolite and Kojève -  maître and esclave. A new French 
translator of Phenomenology, Jean-Pierre Levebvre (1991), referring to a biblical 
dimension of the pair Herr und Knecht, suggests still another possibility: maître 
and Valet, rendering Knechtschaft as servitude. In Poland, new proposals by 
Marek J. Siemek (from Philosophy of Completed Modernity -  Hegel, Torun: 
UMK, 1995) go in the same direction as these of Levebvre, presented in 
"L'oeuvre en mouvement" in a Hegelian issue of Magazine littéraire (Nov. 1991, 
No 293), p. 24 -  starting from different positions, they arrive at similar linguistic 
conclusions.
55 Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox and 
J.K. Harding (Cambridge: CUP, 1980), p. 12.
Without getting too much into details of the evolution of Kojève’s 
views (as we are doing it elsewhere) and starting from his Hegelian 
lectures edited and published by Raymond Queneau as well as 
from some of his post-war texts (and especially a correspondence 
with his most serious philosophical adversary, Leo Strauss, 
published four years ago, which provides their polemics about the 
figure of the "tyrant" and a" philosopher" with an additional 
dimension), I would be inclined to say, agreeing with his numerous 
French and American commentators, that his work is a splendid 
example of a genius of propaganda. A genius which promotes 
Hegel, Marx, Heidegger -  as well as Kojève -  at the same time 
and which is a "very talented story-teller" (Descombes), provides 
his revelational -  and revolutionary -  interpretations as Hegel’s 
message to France on the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the 
Revolution.57 Historical circumstances favored indeed such a 
prophetic reading and commenting: the period of Hegelian 
sem inars reminded in its in tensity that of w riting  the 
Phenomenology itself -  cannon sounds during the battle of lena, 
Hegel completing his work, Napoleon, that l ’âme du monde à 
cheval, parading in front of Hegel’s windows on his horse. The war, 
violence, interventions in Spain, generally, a culmination of 
pre-war tensions in the form of the outbreak of the world war. 
Precisely -  the "world" one, on a "world" dimension, like 
Napoleonic wars were "world" ones for the first time in history. 
Once again the clue to thinking about the world was History with 
the capital ’h’ (Czesław Miłosz in a short text about Albert Camus, 
"Fraternal Interlocutor", wrote that in the forties and fifties French 
intellectuals were fascinated by History -  "we [here in Central
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57 It is sometimes said that Kojève gave France "interpretations" of Hegel 
while Hyppolite gave it "commentaries", the former being subjective, often 
unfaithful and foreign to Hegel, the latter being an example of an objective, cold 
and modest philosophical work. Not accidentally in numerous contemporary 
works devoted to Hegel and written by French historians of philosophy -  Kojève's 
book Is not even mentioned... It is simply unbelievable considering the influence 
of one and the other on post-war French thought. Jacques d’Hondt, an 
established French Hegelian authority, says that Hyppolite presented a deep 
commentary, while Kojève merely interpreted some aspects and some chapters 
of the Phenomenology-that he had specifically chosen. See Magazine littéraire 
No 293, p. 32.
r
Europe -  MK] were also fascinated by it, but in a different way. 
They longed for personal saturation with historicity. We were 
saturated with it in abundance...").
One of the participants in Kojève’s Hegelian seminars was 
Georges Bataille who simultaneously attempted to write about 
Nietzsche, protesting as the first in France against appropriation 
of him by the Nazi ideology58. Sometimes it is said that Bataille’s 
intention was anti-Hegelian right from the start and the tool for his 
struggles with Hegel was to be Nietzsche read extremely intensely 
and personally59. (As Bataille put it in On Nietzsche: "Except for 
a few exceptions, my company on earth is mostly Nietzsche" or 
"My life with Nietzsche as a companion is a community. My book 
is this community"60). But personally I share the view -  and I am 
not isolated in this respect for the same goes for e.g. Denis 
Hollier61 -  that Bataille as the only French philosopher of the 
period that interests us here is neither Nietzschean nor Hegelian 
(staying close to both). It is perhaps so that as the only one he 
needed in his thinking both a transgressive as well as a dialectical 
element-in his Summaatheologica (Inner Experience, Guilty, On 
Nietzsche) he revealed a Nietzschean part of his work and in The 
Accursed Share its Marxian-Hegelian side. Divided into two, 
Bataille wrote under the sign of both philosophers, rejecting at the 
same time an unambiguous and permanent subordination either 
to Nietzschean textuality (the "irresponsibility" of which Pierre 
Klossowski writes so much) or to everything that is brought about
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58 For instance in such texts as "Nietzsche and the Fascists" or "Nietzschean 
Chronicle" translated in English by A. Stoekl in Visions of Excess. Selected 
Writings 1927-1939 (Manchester: Manchester UP), 1985.
59 See Bruno Karsenti, "Bataille anti-hégélien?", Magazine littéraire, Nov. 91, 
No 293, pp. 54-57. To how deplorable results can lead reading Bataille as a mere 
sociologist, see a very poor book by Michael Richardson, Georges Bataille 
(London: Routledge, 1994). From among a couple of books I know, the most 
philosophically interesting to me was Jean-Michel Besnier’s La politique de 
l ’impossible (Paris: La Découverte, 1988).
60 Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, trans, by B. Boone (New York: Paragon 
House, 1992), pp. 3, 9.
61 See Denis Hollier, "Le Dispositif Hegel/Nietzsche dans la bibliothèque de 
Bataille", L'Arc, 38, pp. 35-47.
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by social-oriented thinking 62 One the one hand, he was looking 
in a Nietzschean manner for Hegel’s non-knowledge, what 
remains un-thought in his system and what he found in "poetry, 
laughter, ecstasy" as blind spots of the system63, being distant 
from the community and political and social mission of the 
philosopher and close to a transgression restricted to the text64; 
on the other hand, he was writing his counter-history of civilization 
in which work was a mark of slavery rather than a road to 
emancipation and where social power was associated only with 
destruction, and not production.
6 .
"Dialectic of mastery and slavery" from Kojeve, Bataille with his 
idea of general rather than restricted economy, to Foucault and 
Derrida, was a constant in French thought, Descombes says. 
Chapter Four of the Phenomenology became the most frequently 
discussed -  and appropriated and then digested -  passage from 
Hegel’s writings. Not surprisingly enough, the opposition against 
Hegel’s domination in the years of 1930-60 appeared both in 
Foucault and Derrida e.g. in considerations on dialectical 
conception of history, on the place reason occupies in history as 
well as on dialectic itself. Let us take into account several texts 
representative for that period, leaving aside others, sometimes 
devoted to Hegel to a large extent (such as Derrida’s G/as): 
Foucault’s "Preface to Transgression" and "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History" and Derrida’s Positions and "Hegelianism 
Without Reserve". For what we mean is not so much, and not only, 
to show the relation of the two thinkers to Hegel’s philosophy but 
rather to indicate opposing Hegel -  precisely with Nietzsche, and
62 I present in more detail the opposition between textualists and 
communitarians in post-war French culture in a text "’They should only follow the 
one who leads...’ or on philosophy and politics (Sartre-Barthes-Foucault)" in A. 
Jamroziakowa (ed.), Revisions -  Continuations, Poznan: Humaniora, 1996.
63 Georges Bataille, Inner Experience, trans. by L.A. Boldt (New York: SUNY 
Press, 1988), p. 111.
64 See Allan Stoekl, Agonies of the Intellectual (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1992).
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it is there that this can be seen most clearly. The atmosphere of 
the "new Nietzsche" in question can be seen from the opening 
sentence from Klossowski’s book on Nietzsche: "how is one to 
speak of ’Nietzsche’s though’ without ever referring to what has 
been said about him"; besides, Nietzsche there is supposed to 
reject the attitude of a "teaching philosopher”, to give up writing "in 
care of the human condition".®5 And it was not accidentally that 
Michel Foucault asked about his philosophical identity said in "Le 
retour de la morale", his last interview -  given while he was 
correcting two last volumes of his History of Sexuality -  that two 
fundamental experiences which had shaped his philosophical 
development were Heidegger and Nietzsche. Mentioning his 
"fundamental Nietzscheanism", he says exactly the following: "Je 
suis simplement nietzschéen" - 1 am just a Nietzschean.65 6
Foucault’s homage paid to Bataille, the founder of Critique- in 
"A Preface to Transgression" -  powerfully shows "the Nietzschean 
turn" in France67: the author writes there about our falling "asleep 
in dialectic and anthropology" (which, I suppose, refers us back 
directly to Hegel and Kojcve) from which only Nietzsche can wake 
us up. Discursive language, however, like in the passage from 
Levinas cited above, becomes "ineffectual" and "nearly silent".68 
There remain non-Hegelian, non-philosophical writers such as 
Klossowski or Blanchot (or also, in Foucault’s view, Bataille) who 
as the only thinkers can find proper words to express the 
experience of transgression. Foucault says, presenting a peculiar 
proportion, that "perhaps one day it [the experience of
65 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux (Mercure de France, 
1969), in Polish as Nietzsche i błędne koło, trans. B. Banasiak and 
K. Matuszewski, Warsaw: Wyd. KR, 1996, p. 62.
66 Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits 1954-1988 (Pans: Gallimard, 1994), vol. IV, 
p. 704.
67 One also speaks of the "aesthetic turn" -  see James J. Winchester, 
Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn. Reading Nietzsche After Heidegger, Deteuze, 
Derrida (New York: SUNY Press, 1994). Especially important, in my view, are 
moral implications of this turn in French philosophy, discussed recently by 
Richard Rorty in CIS in an opposition between moralists and aesthetes.
68 Michel Foucault, "A Preface to Transgression" in Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald 
F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977), p. 38.
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transgression -  MK] will seem as decisive for our culture, as much 
a part of its soil, as the experience of contradiction was at an earlier 
time for dialectical thought".69 If the experience of contradiction 
corresponds to the Hegelian dialectical thinking, that of 
transgression must correspond to some totally new thinking - 
maybe the thinking of Foucault himself? Philosophical language 
is to be characterized by "profound silence" and in a language 
stripped of dialectics, the philosopher is aware that "we are not 
everything". A new search for limits is to replace an old search for 
the whole, and transgression is to replace the Hegelian movement 
of contradictions. The language of philosophy remains "bound" as 
long as it does not think over the experience of the limit.70 The 
genealogist, as opposed to the historian, learns that "behind 
things" there is no timeless and essential secret but rather the 
secret that they have no essence.71 The Foucauldian genealogist 
is as anti-Platonic as Nietzsche and as anti-Hegelian as Deleuze.
And finally Jacques Derrida who always struggles with Hegel 
in different forms, stating explicitly about his relation to Hegel that 
"we will never be finished with the reading or rereading of Hegel, 
and, in a certain way, I do nothing other than attempt to explain 
myself on this point".72 Hegelianism for him is "the ultimate 
reassembling of metaphysics"73, the culmination of the logocentric 
tradition running from Plato. Derrida does not create, however, 
being aware of difficulties of philosophical thinking against Hegel, 
a totally anti-Hegelian stance.74 Referring to Levinas, he says, 
disclosing his own strategy towards Hegel: "as soon as he speaks 
against Hegel, Levinas can only confirm Hegel, has confirmed him
69 Ibidem, p. 33.
70 Ibidem, p. 41.
71 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews, p. 142.
72 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 
1987), p. 77.
73 Jacques Derrida, “The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel’s 
Semiology" in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), p. 80.
74 See Włodzimierz Lorenc, Hegel i Derrida. Filozofia w wersji radykalnej 
(Warsaw: IF UW, 1994, in Polish), p. 254.
already".75 The game with Hegel is going on the margins of 
Bataille’s reading of him as presented in Derrida’s Writing and 
Difference. Bataille was to have taken Hegel too seriously, he was 
to have taken the absolute knowledge too seriously 76 Comparing 
Hegel’s "mastery" and Bataille’s "sovereignty", Derrida comes to 
the conclusion that Hegel did not see the possibility of existence 
of anything outside his system -  for instance, poetry, laughter, 
ecstasy, which neither are knowledge nor provide it. Excess, 
dépense -  are beyond reason. And it is not accidentally that a 
considerable part of post-war French thought mentions the theme 
of Hegel’s "madness" from the period before he had not completed 
his system: namely, how is one to accept the fact of being the 
incarnation of the Absolute Spirit, of announcing the end of history, 
without being at the same time -  God? Although there is no 
definition of the Derridean différance, if it were one, there might 
perhaps be that of suppressing the Hegelian Aufhebung wherever 
it operates, as he says in Positions. Hence the affinity of the 
différance with all operations against Hegel’s dialectical 
speculation. Both in Derrida, as well as in Foucault, the opposition 
to Hegel gives birth to the escape towards Nietzsche (and, 
incidentally, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, next generation of 
French philosophers and today’s opponents of both Nietzschean 
postmodernists and of their Nietzsche, publish collective volumes 
entitled provocatively Pourquo i  nous ne sommes pas  
nietzschéens (1991) -  why are we not Nietzscheans... So, who 
are we?)
To sum up this little walk taken to the French postmodern 
thought, let us say that we did not mean to deal in detail with any 
of the postmodern figures described here, or with any 
commentators of Hegel first and then of Nietzsche. What we meant 
here was the topicality of Hegel today; we merely attempted to 
outline his constant and permanent presence in subsequent 
generations of French philosophers. The explicit presence in the
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75 Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought 
of Emmanuel Levinas" in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 120.
76 Jacques Derrida, "From Restricted to General Economy. Hegelianism 
Without Reserve" in Writing and Difference, p. 253.
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first generation and the presence-as-negation, presence in fight 
led from new, Nietzschean positions. And whenever we open 
Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies in its Hegelian 
passages, we have to bear in mind the fact that he wrote his book 
in a totally different culture, although at the same time as Kojeve, 
Hyppolite or Bataille -  nowhere in the world was Hegel so alive, 
and so topical, so close and then so controversial, as in the 
post-war France.
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